VESZTEG, Robert Ferenc

Official Title



(School of Political Science and Economics)

Contact Information

Mail Address

Mail Address
Mail Address(Others)


Web Page URL

Grant-in-aids for Scientific Researcher Number



Faculty of Political Science and Economics(Graduate School of Political Science)

Faculty of Political Science and Economics(Graduate School of Economics)

Faculty of Social Sciences(School of Social Sciences)

Affiliated Institutes


研究所員 2016-

Educational background・Degree

Educational background

-2004 Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Graduate School, Division of Economics


Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs

Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

Economics Bulletin 12(23) p.1 - 82007-

Regressão quantílica com correção para a seletividade amostral: estimativa dos retornos educacionais e diferenciais raciais na distribuição de salários das mulheres no Brasil

Danilo Coelho, Fabio Veras Soares, Robert F. Veszteg

Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico 40(1) p.85 - 1022010-

Mon équipe et moi: une expérience sur les normes d'équité et égalité

Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

Revue economique 61(4) p.771 - 7822010-

My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

Journal of Socio-Economics 40(4) p.347 - 3552011-

Information and prospects: Investment opportunities in small-cap segment

German Lopez-Espinosa, Robert F. Veszteg

Revista de Economía Financiera (16) p.52 - 772008-

Sustainability of collusion: Evidence from the late 19th century Basque steel industry

Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

Investigaciones Económicas 33(3) p.385 - 4042009-

Public good games and the Balinese

Erita Narhetali, Robert F. Veszteg

International Journal of Social Economics 37(9) p.660 - 6752010-

College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Joana Pais, Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

International Economic Review 2011-

Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids

Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

European Journal of Political Economy 26(1) p.36 - 502010-

Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

David Perez-Castrillo, Robert F. Veszteg

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiazation 63(3) p.394 - 4112007-

Multibidding game under uncertainty

Robert F. Veszteg

Review of Economic Design 14(3-4) p.311 - 3292009-

Threats and demonstrations of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

Journal of Economic Psychology

Research Grants & Projects

Grant-in-aids for Scientific Research Adoption Situation

Research Classification:

New Theory and Experiment of Coalition formation and Payoff Allocation in Cooperative Game


Allocation Class:¥18070000

Research Classification:

Experimental research on recognition of game structure


Allocation Class:¥4680000

On-campus Research System

Special Research Project

An Experimental Approach to Cultural Comparisons

2014Collaborator:Subhasish Dugar

Research Results Outline: During the past academic year I undertook a research program to During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University of Calgar... During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University of Calgary, Canada). We designed a laboratory experiment to investigate the causal relation between group membership andopportunistic behaviour in a context that is ridden with informational asymmetry. We have collected data from two experimental sessions, and currently working on the related research paper.The context we focus on, otherwise known as an adverse selection problem,deals with two economic actors (a principal and an agent) who face a potentialcollaboration on a mutually beneficial project. If the principal decides to workwith the agent, she may offer a contract that specifies a wage forthe agent in exchange of which the agent is believed to put in work effort thatbenefits principal’s payoff. However, the agent could be a high calibre or a lowcalibre agent, and while that characteristic has an important impact on the results/outcome the agent is able to produce, it constitutes private information for the agent. Standard, neoclassical economic theory suggests that in our framework no interaction (between the principal and the agent) will take place. With the help of our experiments we would like to test a behavioural model which incorporates group identity and suggests a possible solution to the above-described adverse-selection problem. Simply put, we ask: what happens if both the principal and agent are from thesame group?  

Lecture Course

Course TitleSchoolYearTerm
Thesis [E] 03School of Political Science and Economics2019fall semester
Thesis [E] 03School of Political Science and Economics2019spring semester
Doctoral Research Guidance on Experimental Economics AGraduate School of Economics2019spring semester