Name

ASAKO, Yasushi

Official Title

Associate Professor

Affiliation

(School of Political Science and Economics)

Profile

Yasushi Asako is an Associate Professor of Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University. Prior to joining Waseda, he was an Economist at IMES, the Bank of Japan. He is a scholar of formal political theory and applied game theory, and his research interests include electoral competitions, legislative bargaining, and economic bubbles. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, an M.S. in Economics from Hitotsubashi University, and a B.A. in Economics, summa cum laude, from Keio University.

Contact Information

Mail Address

Mail Address
yasushi.asako@waseda.jp

URL

Web Page URL

http://www.yasushiasako.com/

Grant-in-aids for Scientific Researcher Number
70634757

Sub-affiliation

Affiliated Institutes

アメリカ政治経済研究所

研究所員 2012-2014

アメリカ政治経済研究所

研究所員 2015-2015

ソーシャル&ヒューマン・キャピタル研究所

研究所員 2017-

Educational background・Degree

Educational background

1997-2001 Keio University Department of Economics
2001-2003 Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Economics
2004-2009 University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School of Economics

Degree

Ph.D. in Economics University of Wisconsin-Madison

Career

2009-2012Bank of JapanInstitute for Monetary and Economic StudiesEconomist
2012-2015Waseda UniversityFaculty of Political Science and EconomicsAssistant Professor
2015-Waseda UniversityFaculty of Political Science and EconomicsAssociate professor

Research Field

Keywords

political economy,public choice,formal political theory,applied game theory

Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research classification

Social sciences / Economics / Public finance/Public economy

Paper

The Boy who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings against Riding Bubble

Yasushi Asako

Economic Inquiry Peer Review Yes 52(3) p.1137 - 11522014-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This article examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of periods commencing around the starting period of the bubble. If a warning involves the possibility of being issued too early, regardless of the starting period of the bubble, it cannot stop the bubble immediately. Bubble duration can be shortened by a premature public warning, but lengthened if it is late.

Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan

Yasushi Asako

Japanese Journal of Political Science Peer Review Yes 16(1) p.5 - 312015-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

One-sided Games in a War of Attrition

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Peer Review Yes 15(2) p.313 - 3312015-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player’s robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player’s fighting costs are greater.

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal

Yasushi Asako

Japanese Economic Review Peer Review Yes 66(3) p.322 - 3532015-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.

Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?

Yasushi Asako

Journal of Theoretical Politics Peer Review Yes 27(4) p.613 - 6492015-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also assume that voters are uncertain about candidates’ policy preferences. If voters believe that a candidate is likely to be extreme, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium: an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate, with some probability, and approaches the median policy with the remaining probability. Although an extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy than a moderate candidate, regardless of imitation or approach, partial pooling ensures that voters prefer an extreme candidate who does not pretend to be moderate over an uncertain candidate who announces an extreme platform. As a result, a moderate candidate never has a higher probability of winning than an extreme candidate.

Buisiness Cycle and the Entry of Third-party Candidates in the US State-level Elections

Yasushi Asako

Japanese Political Science Review Peer Review Yes 3p.43 - 652016-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:This study offers a new explanation of why third-party and independent candidates, with a marginal probability of winning, run for U.S. state-level elections. We argue that the economic benefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run, and predict that amateur politicians find this particularly attractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during a recession, amateur politicians view an elected office as a more attractive source of income than private jobs, and they pursue political power to change economic prospects by adopting new policies. Building on this argument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of third-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis of panel data of state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 U.S. states between 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed only for state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despite their very small probability of winning, we argue that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

Yasushi Asako

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Peer Review Yes 16(3) p.1501 - 15382016-

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.

Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

Yasushi Asako

Journal of Theoretical Politics Peer Review Yes forthcoming

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized.

(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence

Yasushi Asako

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Peer Review Yes forthcoming

DOIlink

Detail

Publish Classification:Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline:Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

Research Grants & Projects

Grant-in-aids for Scientific Research Adoption Situation

Research Classification:

The Effect of Campaign Promises in Political Competition:

2014/-0-2017/-0

Allocation Class:¥2730000

Research Classification:

Dynastic Politicians, Seniority, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from Japan and the United States

2012/-0-2014/-0

Allocation Class:¥2990000

On-campus Research System

Special Research Project

出馬の政治経済学:立候補の意思決定に関する実証分析

2014Collaborator:松林哲也

Research Results Outline:This projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and indepThis projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independentcandidates into the US state-level election...This projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independentcandidates into the US state-level elections. We argue that the economicbenefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run,predicting that amateur politicians find holding an elected office particularlyattractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during therecession, amateur politicians view that an elected office is a more attractivesource of income as compared to private jobs, while pursuing political power tochange the economic prospect by adopting a new policy. Building on thisargument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number ofthird-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis with panel dataof state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 US statesbetween 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed onlyfor state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despitetheir very small probability of winning, we extend the prospect theory tosuggest that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

「曖昧な公約」に関するゲーム理論的分析の枠組構築

2017

Research Results Outline:Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their electoral promises, which is termed as"political ...Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their electoral promises, which is termed as"political ambiguity." It is reasonable to interpret politicalambiguity as a lottery, that is, a probability distribution on policies, in thefollowing manner: Candidates announce a lottery, and a voter chooses acandidate who announces a better lottery for themselves. However, it is stilldifficult to explain why politicians prefer to use vague promises (i.e., alottery) based on a rational-choice model.To understand the difficulties in thisregard, we should begin by locating a Condorcet winner that allows politicalambiguity. Black (1948) shows that if we suppose that voters can choose only asingle policy, a unique Condorcet winner is at the median policy (i.e., themedian voter's preferred policy). On the other hand, my work supposes a lotteryinstead of a single policy, which is called a Condorcet winning lottery: Alottery that defeats or ties with all other lotteries in pairwise elections. Insummary, the unique Condorcet winning lottery is the median policy when votersare risk-averse or risk-neutral, while its existence is not ensured when votersare risk-loving.

Lecture Course

Course TitleSchoolYearTerm
Public Choice [J] 01School of Political Science and Economics2019spring semester
Behavioral Economics [E] 01School of Political Science and Economics2019spring semester
Game Theory I [E] 01School of Political Science and Economics2019fall semester
Advanced Seminar I [E] 04School of Political Science and Economics2019spring semester
Advanced Seminar II [E] 04School of Political Science and Economics2019fall semester
Advanced Seminar III [E] 04School of Political Science and Economics2019spring semester
Advanced Seminar IV [E] 04School of Political Science and Economics2019fall semester
Thesis [E] 04School of Political Science and Economics2019fall semester
Thesis [E] 04School of Political Science and Economics2019spring semester
Public Choice [E] 01School of Political Science and Economics2019fall semester
Doctoral Research Guidance on Political Economics BGraduate School of Economics2019fall semester
Research guidance(seminar) on Political Science and Economics AGraduate School of Economics2019spring semester
Research guidance(seminar) on Political Science and Economics BGraduate School of Economics2019fall semester
Political Economy IGraduate School of Economics2019spring semester