Name | ## KANEKO, Mamoru | Official Title | Professor | |

Affiliation | （School of Political Science and Economics） | |||

## Contact Information

### Mail Address

- Mail Address
- mkanekoepi@waseda.jp

- Web Page URL
- Grant-in-aids for Scientific Researcher Number
- 40114061

### URL

## Sub-affiliation

### Sub-affiliation

Faculty of Political Science and Economics（Graduate School of Economics）

## Educational background・Degree

### Degree

Engineering Tokyo Institute of Technology

## Academic Society Joined

Japanese Economic Association

Society for Social Choice and Welfare council member

Game Theory Society

Econometric Society fellow

Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory Economic Theory Fellow

## OfficerCareer（Outside the campus）

2011- | Society for the Advancement of Economic TheoryEconomic Theory Fellow |

## Interview Guide

- Category
- Social sciences

## Research Field

### Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research classification

Social sciences / Economics / Economic theory

Informatics / Principles of Informatics / Theory of informatics

Social sciences / Economics / Economic doctrine/Economic thought

## Paper

*Expected utility theory with probability grids and preference formation*

Mamoru Kaneko

Economic Theory Peer Review Yes p.1 - 422019/08-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Small Infinitary Epistemic Logic*

Mamoru Kaneko

The Review of Symbolic Logic Peer Review Yes p.1 - 342019/05-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Approximate Quasi-Linearity for Large Incomes*

Mamoru Kaneko

Mathematical Programming and Game Theory, Springer Peer Review Yes p.159 - 1772018/05-

Publish Classification：Research paper (international conference proceedings)

*Exploring New Socio-Economic Thought for a Small and Narrow Earth*

Mamoru Kaneko

Advances in Applied Sociology Peer Review Yes 08(05) p.397 - 4212018/05-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：The earth has been getting smaller and narrower with the expansion of human activities. Now, it is an urgent task for social scientists to explore and study new socio-economic thoughts for this small and narrow earth. This article provides a normative theory and a descriptive theory for the present and future earth. The former is to provide, viewing the earth and human community as unity, evaluations of possible events and of designs of social institutions. The normative theory helps us think about where we should direct the earth. The latter discusses social sciences for practical management of the earth. Since, however, great diversity of cultures will remain, a unified management of the earth is practically impossible. We are required to rethink and develop new socio-economic thoughts in radical manners.

*An equilibrium-econometric analysis of rental housing markets with indivisibilities*

Kaneko Mamoru and ito Tamon

Spatial Interaction Models -Facility Location Using Game Theory Peer Review Yes 118p.193 - 2232017-2017

*Understanding the Other through Social Roles*

M. Kaneko, and J. J. Kline

International Game Theory Review Peer Review Yes 17(1) p.1 - 312015/01-

*Elimination of Dominated Strategies and Inessential Players*

Mamoru Kaneko and Shuige Liu

Operations Research and Decisions Peer Review Yes 25p.35 - 562015-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We study the process, called the IEDI process, of iterated elimination of (strictly) dominated strategies and inessential players for finite strategic games. Such elimination may reduce the size of a game considerably, for example, from a game with a large number of players to one with a few players. We extend two existing results to our context; the preservation of Nash equilibria and order-independence. These give a way of computing the set of Nash equilibria for an initial situation from the endgame. Then, we reverse our perspective to ask the question of what initial situations end up at a given final game. We assess what situations underlie an endgame. We give conditions for the pattern of player sets required for a resulting sequence of the IEDI process to an endgame. We illustrate our development with a few extensions of the Battle of the Sexes.

*Game Theoretic Decidability and Undecidability*

Tai-Wei Hu and Mamoru Kaneko

WINPEC Working Paper Series, Waseda University E. 1410p.1 - 262014/10-

*Partial Memories, Inductively Derived Views, and their Interactions with Behavior*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 53p.27 - 592013/05-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We explore the inductively derived views obtained by players with partial temporal (short-term) memories. A player derives his personal view of the objective game situation from his accumulated (long-term) memories, and then uses it for decision making. A salient feature that distinguishes this paper from others on inductive game theory is partiality of a memory function of a player. This creates a multiplicity of possibly derived views. Although this is a difficulty for a player in various senses, it is an essential problem of induction. Faced with multiple possible views, a player may try to resolve this using further experiences. The two-way interaction between behavior and personal views is another distinguishing feature of the present paper.

*Symposium: Logic and Economics---Interactions between Subjective Thinking and Objective Worlds*

Mamoru Kaneko

Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 53p.1 - 82013/05-

*Inductive Game Theory: A Simulation Study of Learning a Social Situation*

E. Akiyama, R. Ishikawa, M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Game Theory Relaunched, Chapter 3 Peer Review Yes p.55 - 762013/03-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*A Simulation Study of Learning a Structure: Mike's Bike Commuting*

E. Akiyama, R. Ishikawa, M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Technologies (SIMULTECH 2012), Peer Review Yes p.208 - 2172012/05-

Outline：This paper undertakes a simulation study of a player’s learning about the structure of a game situation. In a simple 1-person example called Mike’s Bike Commuting, we simulate the process by which Mike experiences and accumulates memories about the game structure. It is the basic requirement that to keep an experience as a long-term memory, Mike needs enough repetitions of that experience. By the choice of our simple and casual example, we can discuss relevant time spans for learning. In particular, we argue that the limit case of Mike’s learning as time tends to infinity is of little relevance to the problem of learning. We find also that the concept of “marking” introduced by Kaneko-Kline is important for obtaining sufficient structural knowledge in a reasonable time span. The simulation study shows that Mike’s learning can change drastically with the concept. We also consider Mike learning his preferences from his experiences, where we will meet various new conceptual problems.

*Two Dialogues on Epistemic Logics and Inductive Game Theory*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Advances in Mathematics Research 12p.199 - 2382012-

*Discrimination in Festival Games with Limited Observability and Accessibility*

Mamoru Kaneko and Aniruddha Mitra

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 62p.34 - 452011/07-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*A Measure of Logical Inference and Its Game Theoretical Applications*

Mamoru Kaneko and Nobu-Yuki Suzuki

A Measure of Logical Inference and Its Game Theoretical Applications Peer Review Yes p.139 - 1502011-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper presents a measure of inference in classical and intuitionistic logics in the Gentzen-style sequent calculus. The definition of the measure takes two steps: First, we measure the width of a given proof. Then the measure of inference assigns, to a given sequent, the minimum value of the widths of its possible proofs. It counts the indispensable cases for possible proofs of a sequent. This measure expresses the degree of difficulty in proving a given sequent. Although our problem is highly proof-theoretic, we are motivated by some general and specific problems in game theory/economics. In this paper, we will define a certain lower bound function, with which we may often obtain the exact value of the measure for a given sequent. We apply our theory a few game theoretical problems and calculate the exact values of the measure.

*Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Game Theory p.83 - 1282010-

*Corrigendum: Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Journal of Mathematical Economics Peer Review Yes 46p.620 - 6222010-

*Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Journal of Mathematical Economics Peer Review Yes 44p.1332 - 13632008/12-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we present a more entire picture of the theory moving from the individual raw experiences, through the inductive derivation of a view, to the implications for future behavior. Our developments generate an experiential foundation for game theory and for Nash equilibrium.

*Information Protocols and Extensive Games in Inductive Game Theory*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

Game Theory and Applications Peer Review Yes 13p.57 - 832008-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Duality in comparative statics in rental housing markets with indivisibilities*

M. Kaneko, T. Ito and Y.-I. Osawa

Journal of Urban Economics Peer Review Yes 59p.142 - 1702006/01-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Utility theories in cooperative games*

M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

Handbook of Utility Theory 12(19) p.1065 - 10982004-

*Epistemic models of shallow depths and decision making in games: Horticulture*

M. Kaneko and N-Y. Suzuki

Journal of Symbolic Logic Peer Review Yes 68p.163 - 1862003/03-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：Kaneko-Suzuki developed epistemic logics of shallow depths with multiple players for investigations of game theoretical problems. By shallow depth, we mean that nested occurrences of belief operators of players in formulae are restricted, typically to be of finite depths, by a given epistemic structure. In this paper, we develop various methods of surgical operations (cut and paste) of epistemic world models. An example is a bouquet-making, i.e., tying several models into a bouquet. Another example is to engraft a model to some branches of another model. By these methods, we obtain various meta-theorems on semantics and syntax on epistemic logics. To illustrate possible uses of our meta-theorems, we present one game theoretical theorem, which is also a meta-theorem in the sense of logic.

*Epistemic logic of shallow depths and game-theoretical applications*

M. Kaneko and N.-Y. Suzuki

Advances in Modal Logic Peer Review Yes 3p.279 - 2982002/09-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper presents a multi-modal epistemic logic GLEF of shallow depths. Logic GLEF is a fragment of multi-modal KDn, and enables us to consider interpersonal inferential epistemic complexities. The subscripts E and F are called epistemic structures, which restrict interpersonal epistemic depths involved in formulae and proofs. We give its Gentzen-type sequent formulation as well as its semantics. Also, we provide some meta-theorems in order to evaluate interpersonal inferential epistemic complexities of the provability of a given sequent. These meta-theorems are applied to some game theoretical problems.

*A Map of common knowledge logics*

M. Kaneko, T. Nagashima, N.-Y. Suzuki, and Y. Tanaka

Studia Logica Peer Review Yes 71p.57 - 862002/06-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In order to capture the concept of common knowledge, various extensions of multi-modal epistemic logics, such as fixed-point ones and infinitary ones, have been proposed. Although we have now a good list of such proposed extensions, the relationships among them are still unclear. The purpose of this paper is to draw a map showing the relationships among them. In the propositional case, these extensions turn out to be all Kripke complete and can be comparable in a meaningful manner. F. Wolter showed that the predicate extension of the Halpern-Moses fixed-point type common knowledge logic is Kripke incomplete. However, if we go further to an infinitary extension, Kripke completeness would be recovered. Thus there is some gap in the predicate case. In drawing the map, we focus on what is happening around the gap in the predicate case. The map enables us to better understand the common knowledge logics as a whole.

*Bounded interpersonal inferences and decision making*

M. Kaneko and N.-Y. Suzuki

Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 19p.63 - 1032002/01-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：Individual decision making is based on predictions about other players' choices as well as on valuations of reactions to predictions. In this sense, a player has a prediction-decision criterion for decision making. We develop a theory of prediction-decision criteria, which enables us to capture new phenomena on individual decision making in games. The decision making situation is described in the epistemic logic GL EF EF of shallow depths. There, each player considers his and other players' decision making down to some shallow depths. It is a point of our theory to investigate inferential complexities of interpersonal introspections. In particular, we can discuss a minimal epistemic inferential structure for prediction-decision making. We will find parallel structures in decision making and prediction making, which is called an inner parallelism. The climax of the paper is the consideration of inner parallelisms of prediction-decision making.

*Epistemic logics and their game theoretical applications: Introduction*

M. Kaneko

Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 19p.7 - 622002/01-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Common knowledge logic and game logic*

Mamoru Kaneko

Journal of Symbolic Logic Peer Review Yes 64p.685 - 7001999/06-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We show the faithful embedding of common knowledge logic CKL into game logic GL, that is, CKL is embedded into GL and GL is a conservative extension of the fragment obtained by this embedding. Then many results in GL are available in CKL, and vice versa. For example, an epistemic consideration of Nash equilibrium for a game with pure strategies in GL is carried over to CKL. Another important application is to obtain a Gentzen-style sequent calculus formulation of CKL and its cut-elimination. The faithful embedding theorem is proved for the KD4-type propositional CKL and GL, but it holds for some variants of them.

*Epistemic considerations of decision making in games*

Mamoru Kaneko

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 38p.105 - 1371999-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：From the Ex Ante point of view, an axiomatization of decision making in a game with pure strategies is given, while considering its epistemic aspects in propositional game (epistemic) logic. Our axiomatization consists of four base axioms for predicted final decisions. One of them is an epistemic requirement, which together with the others leads to an infinite regress of the knowledge of these axioms. The resulting outcome of this regress is expressed as the common knowledge of the base axioms.We give meta-theoretical evaluations of the derivation of this infinite regress, and consider its implications in solvable and unsolvable games. For a solvable game, it determines predicted decisions to be the common knowledge of a Nash equilibrium, and for an unsolvable game, it is the common knowledge of a subsolution in Nash’s sense. The latter result needs the common knowledge of the additional information of which subsolution would be played.We give also meta-theoretical evaluations of these results. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

*Inductive game theory: discrimination and prejudices*

Mamoru Kaneko and Akihiko Matsui

Journal of Public Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 1p.101 - 1371999-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper proposes a new theory, which we call inductive game theory. In this theory, the individual player does not have a priori knowledge of the structure of the game that he plays repeatedly. Instead, he accumulates experiences induced by occasional random trials in the repeated play. A stationary state is required to be stable against intentional deviations based on the player's experiences, and then it turns out to be a Nash equilibrium. The main part of the paper is the consideration of possible individual views of the society based on individual experiences. This view is defined to be a model of the society which the player builds from his experiences. Coherency with these experiences and a condition called rationalization are required for a model. As concrete objects of the theory, this paper analyzes the phenomena of discrimination and prejudice. The development of the new theory is undertaken by contrasting its observational and behavioral aspects with mental and judgmental aspects. The relationship between discrimination and prejudice will emerge in this dichotomous consideration.

*Game logic and its applications II*

M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima

Studia Logica Peer Review Yes 58p.273 - 3031997/03-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper provides a Genzten style formulation of the game logic framework GLm (0 ≤ m ≤ ω), and proves the cut-elimination theorem for GLm. As its application, we prove the term existence theorem for GLω used in Part I.

*Axiomatic indefinability of common knowledge in finitary logics. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Game and Decision*

M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima

eds. M. Bacharach, L.A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin and H. Shin. Kluwer Academic Press p.69 - 931997-

*Game logic and its applications I*

M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima

Studia Logica Peer Review Yes 57p.325 - 3541996/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II.

*N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats*

M. Kaneko and W. Mao

Japanese Economic Review Peer Review Yes 47p.235 - 2501996/09-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We consider two models of n‐person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two‐person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.

*The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments*

M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

International Journal of Game Theory Peer Review Yes 25p.245 - 2581996/06-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions — ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality — are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

*On symmetric agents: Comments on Kemp and Shimomura*

M. Kaneko and K.Suzumura

Japanese Economic Review Peer Review Yes 46p.296 - 2991995/09-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall*

M. Kaneko and J. J. Kline

International Journal of Game Theory Peer Review Yes 24p.127 - 1451995/06-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to theperfect recall refinement of a given information partition. This does not, however, imply that the strategies compensate fully for the lack of perfect recall. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on an information partition, calledA-loss, for the informational content of mixed strategies to fully compensate for the lack of perfect recall. The informational content of behavior strategies never fully compensates.

*Axiomatic considerations of Nash equilibrium*

Mamoru Kaneko

Bulletin of the Section of Logic 24p.6 - 121995-

*Widespread externalities and perfectly competitive markets: Examples*

M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

Imperfection and Behavior in Economic Organizations, eds. R. Gilles and P. Ruyes, Kluwer Academic Publisher Peer Review Yes p.71 - 871994-

*A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang*

M. Kaneko and J. Prokop

Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift für Nationalalökonomie) Peer Review Yes 58p.1 - 241993/02-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game withn lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.

*Convention, social prejudices and discrimination: a festival game with merrymakers*

M. Kaneko and T. Kimura

Games and Economic Behavior Peer Review Yes 4p.511 - 5271992/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper provides a simple game-theoretic account of racial discrimination without assuming individual prejudices as a basic concept. We consider a recurrent situation of a festival game with merrymakers, and give a formulation of a stable convention. We show that stable conventions of one type involve discrimination against one group of players. We look closely into the structure of these stable conventions and consider them in comparison with recent developments of sociological thought on ethnic relations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers 026, 900 and American Mathematical Society Classification Numbers 90D10, 90D80, 90D99.

*The ordered field property and a finite algorithm for the Nash bargaining solution*

M. Kaneko

International Journal of Game Theory Peer Review Yes 20p.227 - 2361992/09-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This note proves that the two person Nash bargaining theory with polyhedral bargaining regions needs only an ordered field (which always includes the rational number field) as its scalar field. The existence of the Nash bargaining solution is the main part of this result and the axiomatic characterization can be proved in the standard way with slight modifications. We prove the existence by giving a finite algorithm to calculate the Nash solution for a polyhedral bargaining problem, whose speed is of orderBm(m-1) (m is the number of extreme points andB is determined by the extreme points).

*A game theoretical description of the von Neumann growth model, Game Theory and Economic applications*

M. Kaneko

Lecture notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 389p.369 - 4081992-

*Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium concept and solvability in games with the common knowledge of logical abilities*

M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 22p.229 - 2551991/12-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper attempts to explain the Nash equilibrium concept from the viewpoint of its one-shot play interpretation. We consider a final decision to be made by each player before the game is actually played. We formalize this game situation in terms of an infinitary first-order predicate logic. Then we give an axiom for final decisions—in the two-person case, the central requirement for this axiom is: for players i and j, if x is a possible final decision for player i, then (1) player i knows that x is his final decision; (2) there is a final decision y for player j; and (3) for any final decision y for j, x is a best response to y and player i knows that y is j's final decision. The entire axiom takes the form of the common knowledge of the above requirement by its very nature. We assume that the complete logical abilities of the players are common knowledge. Then we prove that for solvable games in Nash's sense, x is a final decision for player i iff it is common knowledge that x is a Nash strategy. A similar result will be obtained for unsolvable games.

*The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies*

M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

Journal of Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 49p.135 - 1681989/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures—relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions—ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.

*Continuum economies with finite coalitions: core, equilibria and widespread externalities, (with P. Hammond and M. H. Wooders), Journal of Economic Theory 49 (1989), 113--134.*

P. Hammond, M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

Journal of Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 49p.113 - 1341989/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We develop a new model of a continuum economy with coalitions consisting of only finite numbers of agents. The core, called the f-core, is the set of allocations that are stable against improvement by finite coalitions and feasible by trade within finite coalitions. Even with widespread externalities—preferences depend on own consumptions and also on the entire allocation up to the null set—we obtain the result that the f-core coincides with the Walrasian allocations. Without widespread externalities, the f-core, the Aumann core, and the Walrasian allocations all coincide; however, with widespread externalities there is no obvious natural definition of the Aumann core.

*The conventionally stable set in noncooperative games with limited observations II: the application to monopoly and oligopoly*

M. Kaneko

Economic Studies Quarterly 39p.335 - 3551988-

*The conventionally stable set in noncooperative games with limited observations I: definition and introductory arguments*

M. Kaneko

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 13p.93 - 1281987/04-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of it is close to that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, more precisely, is based on their ‘standards of behavior’ interpretation of the stable set. This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. This paper provides the definition and considers certain general properties of our solution concept. Further we consider our solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes and several simple games with a continuum of players.

*The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: the model and some result*

M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 12p.105 - 1371986/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In this paper we develop a new model of a cooperative game with a continuum of players. In our model, only finite coalitions - ones containing only finite numbers of players - are permitted to form. Outcomes of cooperative behavior are attainable by partitions of the players into finite coalitions: this is appropriate in view of our restrictions on coalition formation. Once feasible outcomes are properly defined, the core concept is standard - no permissible coalition can improve upon its outcome. We provide a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core in the case where the players can be divided into a finite number of types. This result is applied to a market game and the nonemptiness of the core of the market game is stated under considerably weak conditions (but with finite types). In addition, it is illustrated that the framework applies to assignment games with a continuum of players.

*Economics with labor indivisibilities-Part I: optimal tax schedule*

Y. Funaki and M. Kaneko

Economic Studies Quarterly Peer Review Yes 37p.11 - 291986/03-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity*

M. Kaneko and Y. Yamamoto

Journal of Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 38p.118 - 1361986/02-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper considers an exchange economy called a generalized assignment market, in which sellers and buyers trade one indivisible commodity possibly with product differentiation for a perfectly divisible commodity. The existence of a competitive equilibrium in this economy is proved using Kakutani's fixed point theorem. This existence theorem is applied to a production economy in which sellers are formulated as producers with convex cost functions. Two examples of housing markets are provided and their competitive equilibria are numerically calculated.

*Economies with labor indivisibilities-Part II: optimal tax schedule*

Y. Funaki and M. Kaneko

Economic Studies Quarterly 37p.199 - 2221986-

*Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games II*

P. Dubey and M. Kaneko

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 10p.247 - 2621985/12-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

*Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games I*

P. Dubey and M. Kaneko

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 8p.111 - 1391984/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

*On interpersonal utility comparisons*

Social Choice and Welfare Peer Review Yes 1p.165 - 1751984/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper argues that interpersonal comparisons of utility levels are difficult in principle and that interpersonal comparisons of utility differences can also hardly be defined based solely on individual choice behavior.

*Reformulation of the Nash social welfare function for a Continuum of Individuals*

M. Kaneko

Social Choice and Welfare Peer Review Yes 1p.33 - 431984-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper provides a new formulation of the Nash social welfare function for a continuum of individuals. The new formulation removes redundant assumptions of Kaneko's original formulation and in particular shows that the continuity axiom on social orderings is unnecessary. The derivation of the Nash social welfare function is also much directer and shorter than Kaneko's original derivation.

*Housing market with indivisibilities*

M. Kaneko

Journal of Urban Economics Peer Review Yes 13p.22 - 501983/01-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：A model of a rental housing market in which houses are treated as indivisible commodities is presented. A recursive equation that determines a competitive equilibrium is provided, and it is argued that this competitive equilibrium is representative of the set of all competitive equilibria. Using this representative equilibrium, several propositions on comparative statics are considered that have to do with how the competitive rents change when certain parameters of the model change.

*Cores of partitioning games*

M. Kaneko and M. H. Wooders

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 3p.313 - 3271982/12-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory*

Mamoru Kaneko

Mathematical Social Sciences Peer Review Yes 3p.281 - 2901982/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

*The central assignment game and the assignment markets*

Mamoru Kaneko

Journal of Mathematical Economics Peer Review Yes 10p.205 - 2321982/09-

Outline：Initially this paper considers an assignment game without side payments and proves the non- emptiness of the core of it. Next, a market model with invisible goods but without the transferable utility assumption is presented, and the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the market model are shown, using the first result. Finally this paper presents a generalization of the market model and also shows the non-emptiness of the core and the existence of a competitive equilibrium using the results in the previous model.

*Linearization of cost functions in public goods economies*

Y. Ito and M. Kaneko

Economic Studies Quarterly 32p.237 - 2461982/02-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*The optimal progressive income tax- the existence and the limit tax rates*

M. Kaneko

Mathematical Social Sciences 3p.193 - 2211982-

*On the existence of an optimal income tax schedule*

Mamoru Kaneko

Review of Economic Studies 48p.633 - 6421981/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*The Nash social welfare function for a measure space of individuals*

Mamoru Kaneko

Journal of Mathematical Economics Peer Review Yes 8p.173 - 2001981/07-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In this paper we consider the Nash social welfare function for a society which is given as an arbitrary finite measure space. We show that the Nash social welfare function for the society is derived from certain rationality criteria.

*The bilateral monopoly and the Nash cooperative solution*

Mamoru Kaneko

Journal of Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 24p.311 - 3271981/06-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Ratio equilibrium in an economy with externalities*

Y. Ito and M.Kaneko

Zeitschrift für Nationalalökonomie 41p.279 - 2941981-

*An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function*

Mamoru Kaneko

Theory and Decision Peer Review Yes 12p.135 - 1481980/06-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This paper provides an extension of Nash's bargaining model. The extension permits the domain of a solution function to contain non-convex sets. First, it is shown that the proposed extension is a mathematical generalization of Nash's bargaining problem. Next, some relations between the extension and the Nash social welfare function are developed. The formal equivalence of the two constructs is demonstrated, and the intuitive significance of the results is discussed.

*A game theoretical interpretation of the Stackelberg disequilibrium*

Y. Ito and M. Kaneko

Keio Economic Studies Peer Review Yes 17p.29 - 401980/01-

*The Nash social welfare function*

Mamoru Kaneko and Kenjiro Nakamura

Econometrica Peer Review Yes 47(2) p.423 - 4351979/03-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：This article considers an economy in which there is one public good financed by means of commodity taxes (lump sum transfers being not available). The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of tax equilibria. Sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with respect to a given tax system are given. When the tax system is modified, the structure of the corresponding set of tax equilibria is analyzed, and continuity properties of equilibria (with respect to the tax system) are stated. In the second part, attention is focused on the Pareto ranking of tax equilibria. In a given equilibrium, the directions of policy tools changes for a Pareto improvement (if any) are characterized. The "size" of the set of second best Pareto optima in the set of tax equilibria is evaluated.

*Cardinalization of the Nash social welfare function*

M. Kaneko and K. Nakamura

Economic Studies Quarterly Peer Review Yes 30p.236 - 2421979-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

*Price oligopoly as a cooperative game*

Mamoru Kaneko

International Journal of Game Theory Peer Review Yes 7(3-4) p.137 - 1501978/09-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We consider an oligopolistic market as follows. In the market, one good is traded for money. Each oligopolist is a price setter and has the same linear cost function. Each buyer is a price taker and buys the good from oligopolists setting the lowest price. We formulate this market as a cooperative game, and consider two kinds of solution concepts, the core and a bargaining set of the game. First we show that in the monopolistic market, the core gives the monopoly price, but in the oligopolistic market, the core is empty. Second, we obtain the bargaining set of the oligopolistic market.

*The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy*

Mamoru Kaneko

Journal of Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 16(2) p.123 - 1361977/12-

Outline：An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.

*The ratio equilibrium and the core of the voting game G(N,W) in a public goods economy*

Mamoru Kaneko

Econometrica Peer Review Yes 45(7) p.1589 - 15941977/10-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In Kaneko [6] we considered the relationship between the ratio equilibria and the core of the voting game G(N, W,r), in which a fixed ratio is given. In this paper we present a new voting game G(N, W) in which no fixed ratio is given, and consider the relationship between the ratio equilibria and the core of G(N, W). We prove that the core of G(N, W) coincides with the ratio equilibria.

*Note on transferable utility*

Mamoru Kaneko

International Journal of Game Theory 5(4) p.183 - 1851976/12-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：We provide a condition for an individual preference ordering to be represented by a function measured in terms of a commodity, i.e., for the commodity to be transferable utility. We also consider the relationships between conditions of the preference ordering and the utility function.

*On the core and competitive of a market with indivisible goods*

Mamoru Kaneko

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly Peer Review Yes 23(2) p.321 - 3371976/06-

Outline：We consider a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [4]. In the market which we consider, s kinds of indivisible goods are exchanged for money. The market consists of buyers and sellers. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the goods, and each seller may sell more than one unit. First, we show that the set of all competitive imputations is given by the solutions of a certain linear programing problem dual to the optimal problem. Second, we show that the core of the market coincides with the set of all competitive imputations under some condition, and consider the core of the market where s=1 and the condition does not hold.

*Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game*

Mamoru Kaneko

International Journal of Game Theory Peer Review Yes 4p.215 - 2191975/12-

Publish Classification：Research paper (scientific journal)

Outline：In this note we consider the core of a game with side payments representing simple majority voting. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the game to have a nonempty core.

*Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory*

Mamoru Kaneko

Journal of Economic Theory Peer Review Yes 11p.385 - 3931975/12-

Outline：In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preferences given by two types of social decision processes. We consider transitivity of the dominance relation of a proper simple game and that of the social preference given by the simple majority decision rule.

## Books And Publication

*社会正義 地界で考える*

金子 守

勁草書房2007/05-

ISBN：978-4326153916

*ゲーム論家の酔夢譚:詩の饗宴*

金子 守

勁草書房2006/03-

ISBN：978-4326550524

*Game Theory and Mutual Misunderstanding*

Mamoru Kaneko, Ruth Vanbaelen

Springer Verlag2004/12-

ISBN：978-3540222958

*ゲーム理論と蒟蒻問答*

金子 守

日本評論社2003/04-

ISBN：978-4535552883

## Lecture And Oral

*Majority Decision Rule with Minority Protection: Cost Assignments for Public Projects*

Mamoru Kaneko

International Conference on Applied Economics(Warsaw School of Economics)Invitation Yes2018/07/05

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw

*Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preferential Incomparabilities*

Mamoru Kaneko

TUSIV(Time, Uncertainties & Strategies IV ) 2017 Conference, Paris, FranceInvitation Yes2017/12/19

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Paris

*Approximate Quasi-Linearity for Large Incomes*

Mamoru Kaneko

2017 Nanjing International Conference on Game Theory and the Fourth Microeconomics workshopInvitation Yes2017/11/18

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Nanjing

*Expected utility theory with probability grids and incomparabilities*

Mamoru Kaneko

The 10th Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and TGU Positive/Empirical Analyses of Political Economy Symposium(Waseda University, Mamoru Kaneko)2017/09/05

International conferenceOral presentation(general)Venue：Waseda University

*Expected Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preferential Incomparabilities*

Mamoru Kaneko

17th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics Faro, Portugal2017/06/28

International conferenceOral presentation(general)Venue：Faro

*Expected of Utility Theory with Probability Grids and Preferential Incomparability*

Mamoru Kaneko

International Forum on Silk Road EconomyInvitation Yes2017/06/20

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Xi’an University

*Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets*

Mamoru Kaneko

Logic and Game TheoryInvitation Yes2016/12/16

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Korean Institute of Advanced Study

*Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets*

Mamoru Kaneko

The 9th Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and TGU Empirical Analyses of Political Economy symposium(Waseda University, Mamoru Kaneko)2016/10/08

International conferenceOral presentation(general)Venue：Waseda University

*Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets*

Mamoru Kaneko

(THE UNION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IN JAPAN)2016/09/11

National conferenceOral presentation(general)Venue：Waseda University

*Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets*

Mamoru Kaneko

The 27th International Conference on Game TheoryInvitation Yes2016/07/21

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Stony Brook University

*A Bridge between Inductive Game Theory and Epistemic Logic*

Mamoru Kaneko

East Asia Game Theory Conference 2015 TokyoInvitation Yes2015/08/25

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Waseda University

*Foundational Issues in Game Theory and Economics*

Mamoru Kaneko

14th SAET (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory) Conference on Current Trends in Economics(Mamoru Kaneko)2014/08/22

International conferenceOral presentation(general)Venue：Waseda University Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo

*Game Theory and Epistemic Logics*

Mamoru Kaneko

9th Tinbergen Institute Conference: 70Years Theory of Games and Economic BehaviourInvitation Yes2014/06/25

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam

*Epistemic Logic and Inductive Game Theory*

Mamoru Kaneko

AI 2012: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 25th International Australasian Joint ConferenceInvitation Yes2012/12/07

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Sydney Harbour Marriott Hotel

*False Beliefs and Decision Making*

Mamoru Kaneko

Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice Second International Conference(St.Petersburg State University)Invitation Yes2001/06/21

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Saint-Petersburg

*Deductive and Inductive Inferences in Game Theoretical Situations*

Mamoru Kaneko

5th International conference on Logic, Game Theory and Social ChoiceInvitation Yes2007/06/20

International conferenceOral presentation(invited, special)Venue：Bilbao

## Research Grants & Projects

### Grant-in-aids for Scientific Research Adoption Situation

Research Classification：

*Logic and Computation of Prediction, Judgment and Decision Making*

2011/-0-2016/-0

Allocation Class：￥81250000

Research Classification：

*game theory*

2009/-0-2014/-0

Allocation Class：￥39650000

Research Classification：

*Integrated study of multi-modal logics and game theory*

Allocation Class：￥3770000

Research Classification：

*Inductive Game Theory and Limited Rationalities : Individual Derivations of Social Views and Behavioral Decision*

Allocation Class：￥10460000

Research Classification：

*Study of multi-modal logics and its application to game theory*

Allocation Class：￥6700000

Research Classification：

*Individual Perspectives of Society and Socio-economic Norms*

Allocation Class：￥8800000

Research Classification：

*Extended Kripke Semantics and its Application to Epistemic Logics and Game Theory*

Allocation Class：￥3900000

Research Classification：

*Advances in Nonstandard Logic*

Allocation Class：￥5500000

Research Classification：

*Experience and Individual Image of the Society*

Allocation Class：￥3000000

Research Classification：

*THEORY OF SOCIAL NORM AND EVOLUTION*

Allocation Class：￥13200000

Research Classification：

*An Interdisciplinary Study of the Interaction between Utterances and Social Contexts in terms of Dynamic Modal Logic*

2017/-0-2022/-0

Allocation Class：￥12220000

Research Classification：

*Majority decision rule with minority protection: meta-agreement by deliberaiton*

2019/-0-2022/-0

Allocation Class：￥6110000

## Lecture Course

Course Title | School | Year | Term |
---|---|---|---|

Fresh-Start Seminar [J] 39 | School of Political Science and Economics | 2019 | spring semester |

Social Evaluation [J] 01 | School of Political Science and Economics | 2019 | spring semester |

Seminar on Global Political Economy III[J] (Kaneko, M) | School of Political Science and Economics | 2019 | spring semester |

Seminar on Global Political Economy IV[J] (Kaneko, M) | School of Political Science and Economics | 2019 | fall semester |

Graduation Thesis[J] (Kaneko, M) | School of Political Science and Economics | 2019 | spring semester |

Graduation Thesis[J] (Kaneko, M) | School of Political Science and Economics | 2019 | fall semester |

Doctoral Research Guidance on Theoretical Economics A | Graduate School of Economics | 2019 | spring semester |

Doctoral Research Guidance on Theoretical Economics B | Graduate School of Economics | 2019 | fall semester |

Research guidance(seminar) on Theoretical Economics A | Graduate School of Economics | 2019 | spring semester |

Research guidance(seminar) on Theoretical Economics B | Graduate School of Economics | 2019 | fall semester |

Expected Utility Theory and Nash Social Welfare Function | Graduate School of Economics | 2019 | summer quarter |

Inductive Game Theory | Graduate School of Economics | 2019 | fall quarter |