氏名

ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ

ヴェステグ ロベルト フェレンツ

職名

教授 (https://researchmap.jp/read0153397/)

所属

(政治経済学部)

連絡先

メールアドレス

メールアドレス
rveszteg@waseda.jp
メールアドレス(その他)
rveszteg@gmail.com

URL等

WebページURL

http://sites.google.com/site/rveszteg/

研究者番号
30597753

本属以外の学内所属

兼担

政治経済学術院(大学院政治学研究科)

政治経済学術院(大学院経済学研究科)

社会科学総合学術院(社会科学部)

学内研究所等

ソーシャルメディアデータ研究所

研究所員 2016年-

学歴・学位

学歴

-2004年 その他(海外の大学等) 経済学研究科

論文

Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs

Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

Economics Bulletin12(23)p.1 - 82007年-

Regressão quantílica com correção para a seletividade amostral: estimativa dos retornos educacionais e diferenciais raciais na distribuição de salários das mulheres no Brasil

Danilo Coelho, Fabio Veras Soares, Robert F. Veszteg

Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico40(1)p.85 - 1022010年-

Mon équipe et moi: une expérience sur les normes d'équité et égalité

Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

Revue economique61(4)p.771 - 7822010年-

My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Robert F. Veszteg

Journal of Socio-Economics40(4)p.347 - 3552011年-

Information and prospects: Investment opportunities in small-cap segment

German Lopez-Espinosa, Robert F. Veszteg

Revista de Economía Financiera(16)p.52 - 772008年-

Sustainability of collusion: Evidence from the late 19th century Basque steel industry

Pedro Mendi, Robert F. Veszteg

Investigaciones Económicas33(3)p.385 - 4042009年-

Public good games and the Balinese

Erita Narhetali, Robert F. Veszteg

International Journal of Social Economics37(9)p.660 - 6752010年-

College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Joana Pais, Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

International Economic Review2011年-

Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids

Agnes Pinter, Robert F. Veszteg

European Journal of Political Economy26(1)p.36 - 502010年-

Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism

David Perez-Castrillo, Robert F. Veszteg

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiazation63(3)p.394 - 4112007年-

Multibidding game under uncertainty

Robert F. Veszteg

Review of Economic Design14(3-4)p.311 - 3292009年-

Threats and demonstrations of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Noemi Navarro, Robert F. Veszteg

Journal of Economic Psychology

外部研究資金

科学研究費採択状況

研究種別:基盤研究(C)

排除可能な公共財供給メカニズムと供給者間競争に関する実験を含めた総合研究

2011年-2013年

研究分野:理論経済学

配分額:¥5070000

研究種別:

Better foundations for better social institutions - theory and experiments

2017年-0月-2020年-0月

配分額:¥4290000

研究種別:

協力ゲームにおける提携形成と利得分配の実験と新しい理論構築

2017年-0月-2022年-0月

配分額:¥18070000

研究種別:

ゲーム構造に対する認識の実験研究

2014年-0月-2017年-0月

配分額:¥4680000

学内研究制度

特定課題研究

An Experimental Approach to Cultural Comparisons

2014年度共同研究者:Subhasish Dugar

研究成果概要: During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University ... During the past academic year I undertook a research program together with Subhasish Dugar (University of Calgary, Canada). We designed a laboratory experiment to investigate the causal relation between group membership andopportunistic behaviour in a context that is ridden with informational asymmetry. We have collected data from two experimental sessions, and currently working on the related research paper.The context we focus on, otherwise known as an adverse selection problem,deals with two economic actors (a principal and an agent) who face a potentialcollaboration on a mutually beneficial project. If the principal decides to workwith the agent, she may offer a contract that specifies a wage forthe agent in exchange of which the agent is believed to put in work effort thatbenefits principal’s payoff. However, the agent could be a high calibre or a lowcalibre agent, and while that characteristic has an important impact on the results/outcome the agent is able to produce, it constitutes private information for the agent. Standard, neoclassical economic theory suggests that in our framework no interaction (between the principal and the agent) will take place. With the help of our experiments we would like to test a behavioural model which incorporates group identity and suggests a possible solution to the above-described adverse-selection problem. Simply put, we ask: what happens if both the principal and agent are from thesame group?  

現在担当している科目

科目名開講学部・研究科開講年度学期
Thesis 03政治経済学部2019秋学期
Thesis 03政治経済学部2019春学期
Research Guidance on Experimental Economics A(Veszteg, R)大学院経済学研究科2019春学期