氏名

アサコ ヤスシ

浅古 泰史

職名

准教授 (https://researchmap.jp/7000001584)

所属

(政治経済学部)

プロフィール

1978年生まれ.2001年慶應義塾大学経済学部卒業.2003年一橋大学で修士号(経済学)取得.2009年ウィスコンシン大学マディソン校でPh.D.(経済学)取得.日本銀行金融研究所エコノミストなどを経て現職.主著に『政治の数理分析入門』(2016年,木鐸社)や『ゲーム理論で考える政治学』(2018年,有斐閣)がある.

連絡先

メールアドレス

メールアドレス
yasushi.asako@waseda.jp

URL等

WebページURL

http://www.yasushiasako.com/

研究者番号
70634757

本属以外の学内所属

学内研究所等

アメリカ政治経済研究所

研究所員 2012年-2014年

アメリカ政治経済研究所

研究所員 2015年-2015年

ソーシャル&ヒューマン・キャピタル研究所

研究所員 2017年-

学歴・学位

学歴

1997年-2001年 慶應義塾大学 経済学部
2001年-2003年 一橋大学 経済学研究科
2004年-2009年 ウィスコンシン大学マディソン校 経済学研究科

学位

経済学博士 ウィスコンシン大学マディソン校

経歴

2009年-2012年日本銀行金融研究所エコノミスト
2012年-2015年早稲田大学政治経済学術院講師
2015年-早稲田大学政治経済学術院准教授

研究分野

キーワード

政治経済学、公共選択、数理政治学、応用ゲーム理論

科研費分類

社会科学 / 経済学 / 財政・公共経済

論文

政治経済学の新展開:中位投票者定理を巡って

浅古泰史

金融研究30(4)p.83 - 1242011年-

link

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

The Boy who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings against Riding Bubble

Economic Inquiry査読有り52(3)p.1137 - 11522014年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:Attempts by governments to stop bubbles by issuing warnings seem unsuccessful. This article examines the effects of public warnings using a simple model of riding bubbles. We show that public warnings against a bubble can stop it if investors believe that a warning is issued in a definite range of periods commencing around the starting period of the bubble. If a warning involves the possibility of being issued too early, regardless of the starting period of the bubble, it cannot stop the bubble immediately. Bubble duration can be shortened by a premature public warning, but lengthened if it is late.

Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan

Yasushi Asako

Japanese Journal of Political Science査読有り16(1)p.5 - 312015年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.

One-sided Games in a War of Attrition

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics査読有り15(2)p.313 - 3312015年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player’s robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player’s fighting costs are greater.

Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal

Yasushi Asako

Japanese Economic Review査読有り66(3)p.322 - 3532015年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.

Campaign Promises as an Imperfect Signal: How does an Extreme Candidate Win against a Moderate Candidate?

Yasushi Asako

Journal of Theoretical Politics査読有り27(4)p.613 - 6492015年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also assume that voters are uncertain about candidates’ policy preferences. If voters believe that a candidate is likely to be extreme, there exists a semi-separating equilibrium: an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate, with some probability, and approaches the median policy with the remaining probability. Although an extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy than a moderate candidate, regardless of imitation or approach, partial pooling ensures that voters prefer an extreme candidate who does not pretend to be moderate over an uncertain candidate who announces an extreme platform. As a result, a moderate candidate never has a higher probability of winning than an extreme candidate.

Buisiness Cycle and the Entry of Third-party Candidates in the US State-level Elections

Yasushi Asako

Japanese Political Science Review査読有り3p.43 - 652016年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:This study offers a new explanation of why third-party and independent candidates, with a marginal probability of winning, run for U.S. state-level elections. We argue that the economic benefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run, and predict that amateur politicians find this particularly attractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during a recession, amateur politicians view an elected office as a more attractive source of income than private jobs, and they pursue political power to change economic prospects by adopting new policies. Building on this argument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of third-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis of panel data of state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 U.S. states between 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed only for state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despite their very small probability of winning, we argue that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

Legislative Term Limits and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

Yasushi Asako

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy査読有り16(3)p.1501 - 15382016年-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.

理論的貢献と実証的貢献のトレードオフ:数理政治学の視点から

浅古泰史

公共選択招待有り67p.66 - 842017年-

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

無投票選挙の数理政治学

浅古泰史

都市問題110(7)p.10 - 142019年07月-

Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

浅古泰史

Journal of Theoretical Politics査読有り31(4)p.626 - 6412019年10月-

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized.

(A)symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence

浅古泰史

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control査読有りforthcoming

DOIlink

詳細

掲載種別:研究論文(学術雑誌)

概要:Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

書籍等出版物

政治の数理分析入門

浅古泰史

木鐸社2016年 06月-2016年 06月

LINK

詳細

ISBN:9784833224949;

ゲーム理論で考える政治学 : フォーマルモデル入門

浅古泰史

有斐閣2018年 12月-2018年 12月

LINK

詳細

総ページ数:338ISBN:9784641149281;

外部研究資金

科学研究費採択状況

研究種別:

公約の政治経済学:公約の選挙・政策への影響を分析する理論の構築

2014年-0月-2017年-0月

配分額:¥2730000

研究種別:

議員属性、特に世襲および年功が公共政策に与える影響に関する理論・実証分析

2012年-0月-2014年-0月

配分額:¥2990000

研究種別:

倒閣の政治経済学:議院内閣制下の政治的エージェンシー問題

2017年-0月-2021年-0月

配分額:¥3640000

学内研究制度

特定課題研究

出馬の政治経済学:立候補の意思決定に関する実証分析

2014年度共同研究者:松林哲也

研究成果概要:This projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independentcandidates into the US state-level...This projectoffers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independentcandidates into the US state-level elections. We argue that the economicbenefits of holding an office is what motivates amateur politicians to run,predicting that amateur politicians find holding an elected office particularlyattractive when the private sector is struggling. This is because, during therecession, amateur politicians view that an elected office is a more attractivesource of income as compared to private jobs, while pursuing political power tochange the economic prospect by adopting a new policy. Building on thisargument, we hypothesize that as the unemployment rate increases, the number ofthird-party and independent candidates increases. Our analysis with panel dataof state house, state senate, and gubernatorial elections in 48 US statesbetween 1980 and 2010 reveals that the hypothesized relationship existed onlyfor state legislative elections. To explain why these candidates run, despitetheir very small probability of winning, we extend the prospect theory tosuggest that these candidates may overestimate their probability of winning.

「曖昧な公約」に関するゲーム理論的分析の枠組構築

2017年度

研究成果概要:Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their electoral promises, which is termed as"p...Politicians prefer to use vague words andoutline several policies in their electoral promises, which is termed as"political ambiguity." It is reasonable to interpret politicalambiguity as a lottery, that is, a probability distribution on policies, in thefollowing manner: Candidates announce a lottery, and a voter chooses acandidate who announces a better lottery for themselves. However, it is stilldifficult to explain why politicians prefer to use vague promises (i.e., alottery) based on a rational-choice model.To understand the difficulties in thisregard, we should begin by locating a Condorcet winner that allows politicalambiguity. Black (1948) shows that if we suppose that voters can choose only asingle policy, a unique Condorcet winner is at the median policy (i.e., themedian voter's preferred policy). On the other hand, my work supposes a lotteryinstead of a single policy, which is called a Condorcet winning lottery: Alottery that defeats or ties with all other lotteries in pairwise elections. Insummary, the unique Condorcet winning lottery is the median policy when votersare risk-averse or risk-neutral, while its existence is not ensured when votersare risk-loving.

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政治経済学研究指導(演習)B(浅古泰史)大学院経済学研究科2019秋学期
Political Economy I(Asako, Y)大学院経済学研究科2019春学期