グエン　ドゥク　ジャン

概要：We find that venture capital (VC) syndicate-backed targets receive higher acquisition premiums and spend more time negotiating transaction terms. The acquirers of syndicate-backed targets receive lower cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcements, but the returns outperform those of individual-backed targets over the long-term. We show that VC syndication creates value for entrepreneurial firms by leading to the appointment of larger and more independent boards of directors prior to acquisitions. VC syndication aligns the incentives of the acquirers’ CEO to that of their shareholders by increasing CEO equity and variable pay. Consequently, syndicate-backed targets prefer stock as the method of payment in acquisitions. Collectively, we show that VC syndication creates value for not only entrepreneurial firms but also their acquirers in the long-term.

掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）

概要：This paper examines the returns of asset acquirers when sellers have different statuses. We find that private sellers create lower returns for acquirers and receive higher premiums than public sellers. Both private equity and private operating sellers generate lower returns for acquirers than public sellers, but their relative gain differences are not significantly different. In addition, the gain difference cannot be explained by acquirer characteristics, sample selection effects, or means of payments, but it increases with sellers’ director ownership. We examine alternative theories to explain our results. While we do not find supportive evidence for the synergy creation and information symmetry hypothesis, we find ample evidence for the manager discretion hypothesis.

掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）

掲載種別：研究論文（学術雑誌）